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Millwood v. State: ANONYMOUS TIP
PROVIDES REASONABLE
SUSPICION NEEDED TO JUSTIFY
AN INVESTIGATORY STOP
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland in Millwood v. State, 72 Md.
App. 82, 527 A.2d 803 (1987) held that an
anonymous tip provided a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of
Defendant's automobile. In so holding, the
court of special appeals affirmed the circuit
court ruling.
On January 31, 1986 at 4:45 p.m., an
anonymous caller informed a Maryland.
State Police dispatcher that a purple "1965
Ford Thunderbird with Pennsylvania
license plates was traveling south on
Interstate 81 on a drug run from Pennsylvania into Maryland." Millwood, 72
Md. App. at 84, 527 A.2d at 804. The
informant alleged that the automobile was
carrying methamphetamines either in the
trunk or taped inside the grill. Additionally, he stated when the car would cross
into Maryland and described its occupants.
Id. at 85, 527 A.2d at 804.
Soon after alerting its counterpart in
Pennsylvania, the Maryland State Police
were informed that such a vehicle was, in
fact, traveling south. Maryland State
troopers were sent out to set up surveillance posts along Interstate 81 near the
state border.
The vehicle was spotted by one of the
troopers at approximately 5:50 p.m. as it
crossed into Maryland. Two state troopers
followed the suspect vehicle hoping to
observe the driver commit a traffic violation. Unfortunately for the officers, this
did not happen. The officers were given no
valid reason to stop the suspect vehicle,
yet, they did.
The troopers motioned for the driver to
pull his car over to the side of the road
after confirming that the car met the informant's description. Charles Millwood, the
driver, pulled over, got out of the car, and
then was ordered to "spread eagle" so that
he could be frisked by the officer. The
trooper informed Millwood that an anonymous tip had been received with information matching .the description of
Millwood's car including its occupants and
that a quantity of methamphetamines
would be in the car. Id. at 86, 527 A.2d at
805.
The parties have differing stories as to
what happened next, but as a result of the
search a large quantity of methamphetamines and two handguns were discovered. Millwood and his female
passenger were then placed under arrest.
At trial, the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the

search was denied. The court reasoned that
there was probable cause to search the car
or alternatively that the Defendant consented to the search. With this evidence,
Millwood was convicted for possession of
methamphetamines along with several
other charges.
On appeal, Millwood contended that the
trial court erred in denying the motion to
suppress the evidence. He asserted that the
information given by the anonymous
tipster was insufficient to constitute probable cause to search. Furthermore,
Millwood insisted that his consent to the
search was not voluntary. Moreover, even
if Millwood had consented to the search,
that consent and the resulting search were
"fruits of the poisoned tree" as products of
an illegal stop. Id. at 87, 527 A.2d at 805
(citing U70ng Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963».
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, however did not agree with
Millwood's contentions. The court found
that the investigatory stop was valid as
well as Millwood's consent to search.
In its reasoning, the court of special
appeals used several Supreme Court decisions. U nder Terry v. Ohio, a police officer
may approach, accost, and temporarily
detain a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal activity
without the probable cause needed for an
actual arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,22
(1968). An officer need only be reasonable
in his conclusion that criminal activity is
afoot. Terry describes this as a "reasonably
articulable suspicion" that a crime is being
or is about to be committed. Id. at 21-2.
This suspicion can be a result of an informant's tip. See, e.g., Adams v. U7illiams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972).
.
Courts are divided on the issue of
whether an anonymous tip constitutes a
reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court
in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
adopted a "totality of the circumstances"
test and held that an anonymous tip,
which police were able to verify as to
various details, furnished probable cause to
issue an arrest warrant. Even though the
informant's credibility was unknown, the
police were able to verify details of the tip,
thus giving credibility to the information
and hence to the informant himself.
Using this approach, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland examined the
anonymous tip in Millwood. The description of the car, its occupants and its route
may not have been enough to justify an
investigatory stop. However, a reasonable
suspicion was gained by the information
regarding the approximate time the car
would travel into Maryland. A casual
observer or mischief maker predicting

such information was highly unlikely.
Regarding Millwood's contention that
the search was invalid, the court of special
appeals looked again to the Supreme
Court for guidance as well as to Maryland
holdings.
The totality of the circumstances test
was examined to determine whether
Millwood's consent was valid. Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 312 U.S. 218, 229 (1973)
states that "account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions as well as the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person who consents."
The two versions of the events surrounding the search of the car were examined by
the trial court. The appeals court accepted
the trooper's story over Millwood's. The
trooper stated that he told Millwood that
he believed he had the right to search the
car, but would like to have Millwood's
permission. Millwood answered, "Go
ahead, we have nothing to hide." With this
consent, the trooper began the search and
discovered the contraband. Millwood, 72
Md. App. at 95,527 A.2d at 809.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland accepted the trial court judgment that voluntary consent was demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at 96, 527 A.2d at 810. No
police coercion was found. Millwood had
relied on U7hitman v. State, 25 Md. App.
428, 336 A.2d 515 (1975), where consent
was given as a result of coercion. The court
in that case identified eight occurrences to
be of "enormous psychological effect and
compelling circumstance." None were
present in the instant case.
Maryland appears to be following the
trend of allowing an anonymous tip to
provide the reasonable suspicion needed to
justify an investigatory stop.
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